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Tensions Underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act: 
Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court 
Family Law Matters 
State courts have historically exercised jurisdiction over family law 
cases. However, under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), Indian 
child custody and adoption cases have been taken out of state jurisdiction 
and placed with Indian tribal governments. State courts have pushed 
back against proper deference to ICWA and violate ICWA by misapply-
ing its provisions and refusing to transfer custody and adoption cases to 
tribal courts. This Note analyzes the state-tribal tensions surrounding 
ICWA and argues that the primary reason for the lack of full state 
acceptance of ICWA is that, historically, states have had nearly total 
jurisdiction over family law disputes, particularly those that go to the 
core of ICWA—child custody and adoption. In recent years, some states 
have changed their tune and have sought to appropriately apply ICWA. 
Even so, misapplication of the law remains a problem in many state 
courts. In December 2016, for the first time since ICWA was enacted, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs published updated rules and guidelines to 
clarify ICWA requirements. This is a major step toward full compliance 
of ICWA in state courts, despite the resistance of states to relinquish 
their jurisdiction over Indian family law cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
State courts have historically exercised jurisdiction over family 
law issues.1 The federal government has in most cases left the 
determination of domestic relations disputes to state courts and 
legislatures due to state court expertise in the area and the federal 
government’s dislike of deciding family law cases.2 However, 
through the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) enacted 
in 1978, Indian child custody and adoption issues have been taken 
out of state jurisdiction and placed with Indian tribal govern-
ments.3 Before ICWA, Indian children faced risk of removal from 
their homes at disproportionately high rates and were typically 
placed in non-Indian homes which contributed to the breakup of 
Indian families and ultimately the loss of tribal members.4 The 
 
 1. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 
1073, 1073 (1994). 
 2. Id. at 1073–74. 
 3. In re M.M., 154 Cal. App. 4th 897, 907 (2007). 
 4. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Myths and 
Mistaken Application, 83 MICH. B.J. 19 (2004). Congress found “that an alarmingly high 
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their 
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high 
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and 
institutions.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006); see also Jessica Di Palma, Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl: The Supreme Court’s Distorted Interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 47 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 523, 525–26 (2014). 
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purpose of ICWA is to reverse the historic and recent effects of 
removal of Indian children from their homes and tribal commu-
nities5 through both procedural and substantive protections in 
custody proceedings6 so that “where possible, an Indian child 
should remain in the Indian community.”7 
Not all state courts have easily parted with this portion of 
family law.8 State courts have pushed back against full implemen-
tation and support of ICWA because of their traditional juris-
diction over family law matters. From the early years of the 
existence of the United States, states have struggled against the 
sovereignty of Indian tribes.9 Instead of accepting tribes as third 
sovereigns, as the federal government dictates, states often view 
tribal jurisdiction as an intrusion into state authority.10 In recent 
decades, the federal government has begun to federalize certain 
aspects of family law, taking matters such as abortion and the 
definition of marriage out of the hands of states and into the 
regulation and constitutional determination of the federal govern-
ment.11 Many states have found ways to skirt around tribal juris-
diction where ICWA should apply and make Indian child custody 
determinations in state court.12 Two prominent state court misap-
plications of ICWA include the best interest of the child exception 
and the existing Indian family exception.13  
The result of state violations of ICWA is that the purpose of 
ICWA in keeping Indian children in their homes and communities 
is not met.14 Some states have taken steps to ensure the proper 
 
 5. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 1, 292 (2012). 
 6. Myers, supra note 4, at 20. 
 7. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978). 
 8. See Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, The Indian Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Essential 
Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131, 140 (1989) (discussing In re Lelah-Puc-Ka-Chee, the 
earliest reported case involving tribal-state family law tensions). 
 9. See generally id. at 139–40. 
 10. See id. at 140. 
 11. LYNN D. WARDLE, MARK P. STRASSER & LYNNE MARIE KOHM, FAMILY LAW FROM 
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND COMMENTARY ch. 1 § D (2014); see also discussion infra 
Section III.B. 
 12. Suzanne L. Cross, Angelique G. Day & Emily C. Proctor, Working on the Front 
Lines, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT THIRTY 3, 5 (Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel & Kathryn E. Fort eds., 2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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application of ICWA; however, the most important response to 
the inconsistent state court application of ICWA has come from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA). In 2015 and 2016, the BIA 
published new ICWA guidelines and revised rules.15 These new 
regulations were designed to improve the proper and consistent 
application of ICWA across the country, thus protecting Indian 
children and communities.16 
This note will examine the lack of state acceptance of ICWA, 
arguing that this lack of acceptance stems primarily from states 
seeking to maintain control over child custody family law matters 
that have traditionally been left to state courts to decide. ICWA is 
the main intrusion into their jurisdiction in this area, and state 
courts are reluctant to recognize tribal sovereignty, especially in 
difficult and emotionally charged child custody disputes. Part II 
reviews the history and nature of tribal sovereignty and the rela-
tionship between the three sovereigns: the federal government, 
states, and tribes. This background is important to understanding 
the sovereignty of tribes and the tension between tribal and state 
jurisdiction. Part III discusses the history of state family law juris-
diction. Part IV analyzes the purposes and provisions of ICWA. 
Part V examines state court misapplication or lack of application of 
ICWA. Part VI discusses the recent ICWA rules and guidelines im-
plemented by the BIA and the potential future impact of those reg-
ulations on state court ICWA implementation. Part VII concludes. 
II. HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
A. Discovery and Settlement 
The United States recognizes tribal sovereignty. The Supreme 
Court in Worcester v. Georgia stated that “Indian nations had 
always been considered as distinct, independent political 
 
 15. See Suzette Brewer, BIA Releases New ICWA Guidelines to Protect Native Families 
and Children, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 26, 2015), https://indiancountrymedianetwork 
.com/news/politics/bia-releases-new-icwa-guidelines-to-protect-native-families-and-children/ 
[hereinafter Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines]; Suzette Brewer, Breaking: BIA Publishes Final 
ICWA Rule, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (June 8, 2016), https://indiancountrymedia 
network.com/news/politics/breaking-bia-publishes-final-icwa-rule/ [hereinafter Brewer, 
Final ICWA Rule]; 25 C.F.R. § 23 (2016). 
 16. See sources cited supra note 15. 
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communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undis-
puted possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”17 However, 
those nations who “discovered” America and its indigenous peo-
ples did not always subscribe to the idea that Indian nations are 
sovereign and retain rights.18 
The lack of recognition of tribal sovereignty began during the 
discovery of the Americas with European efforts to convert the 
native population. The Catholic Crusades of the eleventh through 
thirteenth centuries were the beginning of an effort to bring 
Christianity to non-Christian peoples outside Europe.19 These holy 
wars were justified because the pope had the responsibility to lead 
the “infidels” to Christian conversion.20 This attitude carried on 
during the European settlement of the Americas. Conversion was 
seen as necessary because the natives did not have a common 
religion or law; did not have normal social intercourse, money, 
metal, or writing; did not have European-style clothing; and 
“lived like animals.”21 According to Pope Innocent IV, “[t]he pope 
can order infidels to admit preachers of the Gospel” and “if the 
infidels do not obey, they ought to be compelled by the secular 
arm and war may be declared against them . . . .”22 
The European’s perceived right to settlement was based on the 
Doctrine of Discovery.23 The Doctrine of Discovery posited that 
the first European, Christian nation to discover new lands auto-
matically gained exclusive property rights of the non-Christian 
nation, even though the natives already occupied those lands.24 
England claimed rights of first discovery through John Cabot’s 
discoveries of the east coast of North America.25 France’s 
 
 17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832). 
 18. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 4. 
 19. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 44–45 
(7th ed. 2011). 
 20. Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 
1, 9–10 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 10. 
 22. Innocent IV, Commentaria Doctissima in Quinque Libros Decretalium, in THE EXPAN-
SION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191–92 (James Muldoon ed., 1977); see also Miller, supra 
note 20, at 11 (“[T]he pope had authority to deprive pagans of their property and 
sovereignty when they failed to admit Christian missionaries or violated natural law.”). 
 23. See Miller, supra note 20, at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 16. 
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contestation of England’s claims ultimately led to the French and 
Indian War, after which France ceded its claims east of the 
Mississippi to England and west of the Mississippi to Spain.26 
Jamestown was the first permanent English colony in North 
America, and justification for its establishment was that the 
English were bringing the glory of God and civility to people who 
lived in darkness and ignorance.27 In Calvin’s Case, one of the most 
important English cases of this period, England’s Lord Chief 
Justice Edward Coke stated that Indians are perpetual enemies to 
Christians.28 The court adopted the Doctrine of Discovery and 
stated that “if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an 
infidel, and bring them under his subjection, there ipso facto the 
laws of the infidel are abrogated.”29 
Many European nations issued grants and charters to their 
subjects, asserting jurisdiction over discovered lands.30 For exam-
ple, Columbus was given permission for an Atlantic crossing by 
the Spanish Crown in 1492.31 Peaceful means of settlement be-
tween European nations occurred “principally because it was 
more expedient for the individual nations to compromise their 
exaggerated claims than to fight over them.”32 It was easier to give 
up some land rather than war with other nations. In voyage 
accounts, Indians were seen as mere objects of European desires: 
for labor, wealth, or from which to gain land.33 
Not every European believed that the Indians lacked land 
rights, however. During the time of colonial settlement, Spanish 
legal theorists questioned the authority of the Crown’s rights 
against the Native Americans.34 The most famous of these theorists 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 55. 
 28. Miller, supra note 20, at 28. 
 29. Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1608); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 17 b. 
 30. WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND WHITE MAN’S LAW 27–33 (2d ed. 1995). 
 31. Christopher Columbus, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.britan 
nica.com/print/article/127070 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 32. WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 32. 
 33. Id. at 28. 
 34. Miller, supra note 20, at 13. 
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was Franciscous de Victoria (c. 1483–1546).35 Victoria developed 
three arguments relating to Spanish explorations, later adopted as 
the “Law of Nations” on Indian rights and status.36  
The first argument was that because Indians were rational 
beings, they possessed natural legal rights.37 The Indians “un-
doubtedly had true dominion in both public and private matters, 
just like Christians, and that neither their princes nor private 
persons could be despoiled of their property on the ground of 
their not being true owners.”38 His second argument was that 
Spanish claim to title of land in the Americas through papal grant 
could not affect the Indian’s inherent rights.39 Indian refusal to 
accept the Christian faith did not create justification for waging 
war on them or seizing their land.40 Although Victoria believed 
that Indians had inherent rights, his third argument mirrored the 
basic European presumption that Indians were inferior to their 
conquerors. Victoria’s third argument was that the Indians’ 
violations of the Law of Nations “might . . . justify a Christian 
nation’s conquest and colonial empire.”41 If the Indians violated 
the natural law rights of the Spanish, which included the right to 
travel to foreign lands, engage in trade and commerce, and send 
missionaries to teach the gospel, then Spain had the right to 
defend itself through a lawful and just war.42 
 
 35. See Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United 
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (1942); Susan L. Piepke, Francisco de Vitoria, SALEM PRESS 
BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (2013). 
 36. Miller, supra note 20, at 14. 
 37. Id. 
 38. FRANCISCI DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 128 (Ernest Nys 
ed., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917). “Now the rule of the law of nations is that what belongs 
to nobody is granted to the first occupant . . . . And so, as the object in question was not 
without an owner, it does not fall under the title which we are discussing . . . . [B]y itself it 
gives no support to a seizure of the aborigines any more than if it had been they who had 
discovered us.” Id. at 139. 
 39. Miller, supra note 20, at 14. 
 40. VICTORIA, supra note 38, at 137–39. 
 41. Miller, supra note 20, at 14 (internal citation omitted). 
 42. Id. at 14–15; VICTORIA, supra note 38, at 154.  
If the Indians—whether it be their lords or the populace—prevent the Spaniards 
from freely preaching the Gospel, the Spaniards, after first reasoning with them 
in order to remove scandal, may preach it despite their unwillingness and devote 
themselves to the conversion of the people in question, and if need be they may 
then accept or even make war, until they succeed in obtaining facilities and 
safety for preaching the Gospel . . . . if there is no other way to carry on the work 
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B. Tribal Sovereign Nations 
The roots of the tension between state and tribal sovereignty 
began with the United States’ dealings with the tribes as sovereign 
nations, illustrated by the negotiation of treaties and the guardian-
ward relationship.43 This section provides background and con-
text of U.S.–tribal relations.  
1. British-tribal dealings 
Throughout early discovery and settlement, the Doctrine of 
Discovery and the protectionist relationship were relied upon to 
deny Indians’ rights to their territory.44 Under the Doctrine of 
Discovery, the Crown could unilaterally take Indian lands; how-
ever, in practice “the colonies frequently obtained the consent of 
the tribes through treaties and purchases in order to settle Indian-
claimed lands.”45 When they could not obtain consent, sometimes 
colonists turned to fraud, duress, or confiscation to acquire the 
desired lands.46  
After the French and Indian War, according to King 
George III’s Royal Proclamation of 1763, territory east of the 
mountains was off limits to settlement and reserved for the tribes 
in order to avoid another costly war.47 The proclamation stated 
that the British had control over Indian land and had the right to 
extinguish Indian title, and in exchange, Britain would protect the 
Indians as wards.48 George Washington refused to accept the 
King’s proclamation and ordered surveys of the tribes’ land.49 
Colonists did not believe the Crown had a right to restrict land 
 
of religion, this furnishes the Spaniards with another justification for seizing the 
lands and territory of the natives and for setting up new lords there and putting 
down the old lords and doing in right of war everything which it is permitted in 
other just wars . . . . 
Id. at 157. 
 43. JASON EDWARD BLACK, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE RHETORIC OF REMOVAL AND 
ALLOTMENT 22, 23 (2015); see generally Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 140–41. 
 44. See Miller, supra note 20, at 28. 
 45. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 57. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 60. 
 48. BLACK, supra note 43, at 22. 
 49. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 60. 
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sale transactions between themselves and the Indians and 
therefore continued to speculate in Indian lands.50 Many Indians 
also challenged the Crown’s governing and met with the British to 
discuss grievances.51  
2. United States–tribal dealings 
After the colonists defeated the British in the Revolutionary 
War, the United States continued the British tradition of dealing 
with the tribes through treaties.52 “The government promised 
security to American Indians in exchange for safe passage through 
Indian territory and the surrender of Native lands.”53 The tribes 
were regarded as sovereign nations with the right to govern their 
people, and all formal negotiations between the tribes and the 
governments were accomplished through treaties.54  
Although the Indian tribes were considered sovereign nations, 
they did not have full rights to their lands.55 In the seminal case on 
Indian land ownership, Johnson v. McIntosh, the Supreme Court of 
the United States accepted the Doctrine of Discovery as the root of 
all land titles in the United States and held that, under this doc-
trine, Indians did not have the right to sell their land.56 The rights 
of the British government of title to all lands occupied by the 
Indians passed to the United States,57 and “the Indian inhabitants 
[were] to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, 
indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be 
 
 50. Id. at 61. 
 51. Id. at 22–23. 
 52. BLACK, supra note 43, at 23. 
 53. Id. 
 54. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 55. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 62. 
 56. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 57.   
The British government, which was then our government, and whose rights have 
passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians, 
within the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a limited 
sovereignty over them, and the exclusive right of extinguishing the title which 
occupancy gave to them. These claims have been maintained and established as 
far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword. The title to a vast portion of the 
lands we now hold, originates in them. It is not for the Courts of this country to 
question the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.  
Id. at 588–89 (1823). 
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deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.”58 
“[D]iscovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title 
of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest . . . .”59 In 
McIntosh, the Supreme Court also determined that land transfers 
made before the Revolution were invalid.60 The consequence of 
McIntosh was that Indians had legal right of occupancy, but the 
U.S. government owned the land. Therefore, the tribes’ rights as 
completely independent, sovereign nations were diminished.61 
Even though treaties between the United States and tribes set 
aside Indian reservations and explicitly provided that the land set 
aside was not to be encroached upon by non-Indians, white set-
tlers continued to intrude on Indian land.62 Rather than enforce 
boundaries and remove settlers from Indian lands, the United 
States continually renegotiated treaties with tribes, resulting in 
diminished tribal territory.63 For example, Cherokee Nation land 
once covered five states, but by the Era of Removal, the tribe’s 
only land lay in Georgia.64 Despite failing to deal fairly with the 
Indian tribes, the United States continued to make treaties with 
the tribes, thereby showing that it continued to recognize them as 
sovereign nations.65 This recognition has been relied upon to as-
sert tribal sovereignty in later Supreme Court cases.66 Addition-
ally, support for enacting ICWA came from the determination “that 
Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of deal-
ing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the 
protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources.”67 
 
 58. Id. at 584, 591. 
 59. Id. at 591. 
 60. Id. at 543. 
 61. BLACK, supra note 43, at 34–35. 
 62. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 96. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Miller, supra note 20, at 22. 
 66. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1832). 
 67. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901(2) (West 2006). “[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the 
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” Id. § 1901(3). 
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C. Removal 
U.S.–tribal dealings through treaties resulted in loss of land 
owned by Indians. A continuing desire for more land drove the 
Removal Era. Removal was a way the U.S. government could 
move the tribes who lived east of the Mississippi River to the west 
by exchanging their current lands. This practice opened the 
eastern lands to further white settlement.68 Removal began when 
efforts to assimilate the Indian into American agriculture, trading, 
education, and domestication failed.69 Numerous justifications 
were relied upon for the removal of tribes, including the assumed 
inferiority of Indians and their inability to assimilate into white 
civilization.70 The principal motivating factor to the whites, how-
ever, was to obtain more land.71  
The Era of Indian Removal began with President Thomas 
Jefferson, and in 1830 President Andrew Jackson encouraged Con-
gress to pass the Indian Removal Act.72 President Jackson held the 
view that tribes should not be treated as independent nations and 
that they could not exist independently within the states.  It was 
thus believed that Indians must assimilate and submit to the laws 
of the state or move west.73 The Removal Act provided that land 
west of the Mississippi that was not part of a territory or state 
would be available for tribes should they choose to exchange their 
current lands and move west.74 The Removal Act also provided 
that the new land in the West would be guaranteed by the federal 
government to the Indians and their heirs.75 
Several Supreme Court cases decided during the Removal Era 
shed light on the scope of jurisdiction and sovereignty between 
the states and the tribes.76 Relying on federal policy, Georgia 
 
 68. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 7. 
 69. BLACK, supra note 43, at 27. 
 70. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 94. 
 71. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 7. 
 72. Id.; Indian Removal Act of 1830, 21st Cong. Sess. I. Ch. 148, 411–12 (1830), https:// 
memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=458. 
 73. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100. 
 74. Id. at 98. 
 75. Id. (noting that the Removal Act also provided that “such lands shall revert to the 
United States, if the Indians become extinct, or abandon the same”). 
 76. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515 (1832). 
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passed a law that added Cherokee lands to state lands.77 The tribe 
appealed to the federal government for intervention; however, 
their plea fell on deaf ears.78 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court provided an explanation of tribal sovereignty.79 
Chief Justice John Marshall explained that Indian tribes are dis-
tinct political societies based on the relationship of trust between 
the tribes and the federal government.80 A tribe’s relation to the 
United States is that of a ward to his guardian.81 Although they 
have “unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,” they are not 
fully sovereign nations but “domestic dependent nations.”82 Simi-
larly, in Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall held that Georgia laws had 
no effect within the Cherokee territory.83 However, Georgia 
refused to obey the Court’s mandate, and President Jackson sup-
ported Georgia’s “claimed sovereignty over Cherokee lands.”84 
Although the Cherokee challenged the removal policy, in 1838, 
thousands of Cherokee were forcibly removed from Georgia on 
the Trail of Tears to what is present-day Oklahoma.85 
D. Allotment and Assimilation 
Allotment forced assimilation of Indians into white culture 
and further diminishment of tribal lands. Further expansion 
westward meant that tribes who had removed to the West were 
soon surrounded by settlers, whose thirst for land did not stop at 
the Mississippi.86 The Allotment policy, beginning in 1887, served 
to open up even more land for white settlement.87 The General 
Allotment Act, known as the Dawes Act, allotted the reservations 
 
 77. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–20. 
 80. Id. at 17–18. 
 81. Id. (“Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely 
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
president as their great father.”). 
 82. Id. at 17. 
 83. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
 84. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 122–23. 
 85. See generally BLACK, supra note 43, at 59; ANDREW DENSON, MONUMENTS TO 
ABSENCE: CHEROKEE REMOVAL AND THE CONTEST OVER SOUTHERN MEMORY (2017). 
 86. BLACK, supra note 43, at 81. 
 87. See PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
05.MACLACHLAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:05 AM 
455 Tensions Underlying the ICWA 
 467 
to individual tribal members in order to further the objectives of 
assimilating Indians and extinguishing tribal sovereignty.88 The 
reservation lands were divided, with some sections going to Indi-
ans and the rest being sold to non-Indian farmers and ranchers.89 
It was thought that the tribes would soon dissolve and the Indians 
would be absorbed into the settler community.90 With the loss of 
land due to Allotment, the tribes lost their ability to be self-
sufficient and became more dependent on the federal government 
for rations and services.91 
Judicial decisions and legislation passed around the Allotment 
Era continued to have conflicting outcomes regarding tribal sover-
eignty and federal power over tribes. In Ex Parte Crow Dog, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the principle of tribal sovereignty.92 The 
issue in Crow Dog was whether the federal government had juris-
diction to try an Indian man for murdering another Indian man in 
Indian country.93 The Court held that the tribe, not the federal 
government, had jurisdiction.94 In discussing the general policy of 
the government toward the Indians, the Court stated that the 
Indian tribes were 
semi-independent tribes whom our government has always 
recognized as exempt from our laws, whether within or without 
the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to 
their domestic government, left to their own rules and traditions, 
in whom we have recognized the capacity to make treaties, and 
with whom the governments, State and national, deal . . . in their 
national or tribal character . . . .95 
The Court reasoned that tribes have their own sovereignty and 
unless there is a clear expression by Congress indicating otherwise, 
statutes and treaties should be read narrowly to avoid abridgment 
of that sovereignty.96 
 
 88. Id. at 8–9. 
 89. Id. at 9. 
 90. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 335 (1998). 
 91. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 140–41. 
 92. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 93. Id. at 557. 
 94. Id. at 571–72. 
 95. Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617). 
 96. Id. at 572. 
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On the other hand, some subsequent federal actions served to 
undermine tribal sovereignty. Congress reacted to Crow Dog by 
enacting the Major Crimes Act in 1885, which gave the United 
States jurisdiction over certain serious crimes committed by an 
Indian against another Indian, in Indian country.97 In United 
States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the Major Crimes Act based on the trust relationship, which 
maintains that Indians are wards of the nation and are dependent 
on and need protection from the United States.98 Although the 
Supreme Court reinforced the plenary power of Congress to 
abridge tribal criminal jurisdiction, the Court also noted the lack 
of state jurisdiction over the tribes99: “These Indian tribes are the 
wards of the nation . . . . They owe no allegiance to the States, and 
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, 
the people of the States where they are found are often their 
deadliest enemies.”100 
In addition to taking away criminal jurisdiction from tribal 
governments in cases in which Indians commit certain crimes on 
reservations, “Congress placed federal agents on reservations to 
supervise tribal activities more closely.”101 Although the Supreme 
Court recognized tribal sovereignty in Crow Dog, in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate 
treaties.102 The Court held that legislation that allowed Congress 
to divest tribes of their lands, in breach of the terms of a treaty, 
was constitutional.103 The Court reasoned that Congress has exer-
cised plenary power over tribal relations from the beginning of 
their relationship and this was a political power, not to be ques-
tioned by the judiciary.104 
 
 97. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 157; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). 
 98. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–85 (1886); see also BLACK, supra note 
43, at 99. 
 99. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84. 
 100. Id. 
 101. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8. 
 102. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); see also PEVAR, supra note 5, at 
50 (“According to the Court, a federal treaty and a federal law have equal authority. In the 
same way that Congress may pass a federal law that amends or repeals an earlier law, 
Congress may also pass a law that amends or repeals an earlier treaty.”). 
 103. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. 
 104. Id. at 565. 
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E. Boarding School Era 
Throughout the history of the conquest of Indian lands and 
the U.S. government’s dealings with Indian tribes, the tribes 
became weak and were forced into dependence.105 The federal 
government’s use of Indian boarding schools added to the weak-
ening of tribes and contributed to the need for safeguarding Indi-
an children and tribes through legislation such as ICWA. 
The Boarding School Era began in the Allotment Era, during 
which Indian children were taken from their homes and sent to 
boarding schools where they were stripped of their culture and 
“civilized.”106 The boarding schools were run by government and 
private missions and generally located far from the reservations.107 
More than 200 boarding schools had been established by 1887 
with more than 14,000 Indian children, who had largely been 
forcibly removed from their homes.108 
Like the General Allotment Act, the goal of the boarding 
schools was to assimilate and civilize the Indians.109 Captain 
Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Carlisle Indian boarding 
school in Pennsylvania said, “all the Indian there is in the race 
should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man.”110 The 
boarding schools were based on this premise.111 The children were 
typically not allowed to speak their native language, practice their 
 
 105. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84  (“These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They 
are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. 
Dependent for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so 
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties 
in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. 
This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, 
whenever the question has arisen.”). 
 106. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a 
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602 (2002) [hereinafter 
Atwood, Flashpoints]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
 109. Id. 
 110. N. SCOTT MOMADAY, THE MAN MADE OF WORDS 101 (1997); ROBERT ALLEN 
WARRIOR, THE PEOPLE AND THE WORD: READING NATIVE NONFICTION 96 (2005) (“Pratt’s 
famous educational philosophy was to prohibit the use of Native languages, creating a 
linguistic distance from students’ home communities to parallel the physical distance the 
was already enforced by being at the boarding school.”).  
 111. See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION (1995); WARD 
CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN (2004). 
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religion, or participate in cultural ceremonies.112 In fact, they were 
often severely punished or whipped if they spoke their native 
language or practiced their religion.113 Harry Saslow, a clinical 
psychologist of the Albuquerque Boarding School, noted the 
depersonalization and impersonalization of these boarding schools 
and found that depression among the students was prevalent.114 
The children were taken away from their homes at a young age, 
and some did not see their families for the entire year.115 The 
children felt lonely and deprived of their culture and did not fully 
understand either their Indian culture or white man’s culture.116 
F. Reorganization, Termination, and Self-Determination 
In response to the failure of Allotment to wipe out Indian 
culture, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (the IRA) 
in 1934.117 The purpose of the IRA was to recognize and rejuvenate 
tribal self-government.118 The IRA ended the policy of Allotment, 
returned surplus Indian lands that were open for sale back to the 
tribes, authorized tribes to obtain loans for economic develop-
ment, encouraged tribes to adopt their own constitutions,119 and 
limited the power of the BIA to micromanage tribal governance.120 
Even so, this did not fix many of the issues that came from having 
an outside source—the federal government—dictate Indian 
affairs. The BIA still had close control over tribal government,121 
and the IRA promoted an idea of government that was incon-
sistent with traditional Indian values;122 nevertheless, the IRA was 
a step in the right direction. Although the IRA did not bestow on 
the tribes powers they did not have, it did recognize their inherent 
sovereignty and right to self-governance.123 
 
 112. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 602. 
 113. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8. 
 114. See WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 220–23. 
 115. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 8. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 10. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 79. 
 120. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 190–91. 
 121. Id. at 192. 
 122. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 11. 
 123. Id. 
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After the Reorganization Era, the federal Indian policy pen-
dulum swung back, and Termination was implemented in the 
1950s.124 The idea behind Termination was to repeal the IRA and 
move to a federal policy of “complete integration” and full U.S. 
citizenship of Indians.125 The purpose was to terminate the trust 
relationship between the federal government and the tribes and 
therefore eliminate “federal benefits and support services to the 
terminated tribes.”126 Upon termination, tribes were ordered to 
cease exercising governmental powers and give all tribal land to 
tribal members.127 Tribal reservations were eliminated,128 and 
tribal members were to be subject to the same laws and entitled to 
the same rights and privileges as other United States citizens.129 
Author Wilcomb E. Washburn explained Termination as a way to 
“[w]ipe the slate clean” after years of sins committed against the 
Indians.130 However, he noted that “our rhetoric of freedom and 
liberation for the Indian at home was more a concern for freeing 
our own conscience and our society of a burden, not so much of 
meeting the needs and aspirations of the Indians.”131 
Termination transferred power and many responsibilities 
from the federal government to the states and did nothing to help 
free the Indians.132 The states acquired full jurisdiction over pre-
vious reservation land and tribal members.133 Public Law 280 was 
passed, which extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction into 
Indian country.134 This legislation “transfer[red] responsibility for 
the maintenance of law and order on certain reservations to state 
and local authorities.”135 The educational responsibilities that were 
previously regulated by the federal government and the tribes 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 200. 
 126. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 11. 
 127. Id. at 12. 
 128. Id. 
 129. WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 87. 
 130. Id. at 83. 
 131. Id. at 84. 
 132. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 205. 
 133. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 12. 
 134. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 203; WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 86–87. 
 135. WASHBURN, supra note 30, at 86. 
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were transferred to the states.136 States also had increased legisla-
tive power over the tribes.137 In addition to educational authority, 
the states would have authority over adoptions, alcoholism, land 
use, and other social and economic areas.138 
The Era of Self-Determination is the modern era. After the 
disastrous effects of Termination on the tribes, federal Indian 
policy again shifted in the late 1960s.139 President Nixon advanced 
a new federal Indian policy of “self-determination.”140 The pur-
pose of self-determination was to “strengthen the [Indians’] sense 
of autonomy without threatening [their] sense of community.”141 
Congress supported the rejection of Termination, which had dis-
couraged self-sufficiency, and instead supported tribal control 
over federal programs and education.142 Nearly all of the previ-
ously terminated tribes have been restored to recognition.143 
Legislation favorable to Indian tribes was passed, including the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.144 
III. STATE FAMILY LAW JURISDICTION 
The federal government’s decision to give tribal governments 
jurisdiction over domestic cases falling in the bounds of ICWA 
directly contrasts with the general principal that family law 
 
 136. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 203. 
 137. Id. at 206. 
 138. Id. 
 139. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 12. 
 140. Id. at 12–13. 
 141. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for 
Indian Policy, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, 91st Cong. (2d Sess. July 8, 1970) (statement of Pres. 
Richard Nixon). 
 142. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 218–19 (“In my judgment, it should be up to the 
Indian tribe to determine whether it is willing and able to assume administrative 
responsibility for a service program which is presently administered by a Federal 
agency. . . . [W]e believe every Indian community wishing to do so should be able to 
control its own Indian schools.”). 
 143. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 13. 
 144. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 19, at 220–21; PEVAR, supra note 5, at 13. See GETCHES 
ET AL., supra note 19, at 220–24 for a list of prominent Self-Determination Era legislation 
that favored Indian tribes (noting, however, that the American Indian Religious Freedom 
Act was largely a policy statement and did not provide much religious protection for 
tribes). The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. 
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matters are left to the states to determine. The federal government 
has been hesitant to resolve domestic issues and leaves family law 
matters to the states, even though the Constitution does not expli-
citly prohibit federal courts from hearing family law issues.145 This 
federalism division is based on the idea that federal courts should 
exercise limited jurisdiction and defer to state courts where state 
courts have developed an expertise in domestic relations issues.146 
States generally decide cases involving marriage validity, divorce 
grounds, adoption procedures, paternity claims, and custody stan-
dards.147 This opposition to considering family law issues has 
developed through both legislation and judicial decision-making.148 
The federal government desires to keep family law issues under 
state jurisdiction because “[f]amily law is a traditional area of state 
regulation, and it should be kept separate from the national busi-
ness of the federal courts.”149 However, there are some aspects of 
family law that have become “federalized.”150 This section will 
address Supreme Court cases that illustrate the state court juris-
diction over family law issues as well as briefly address the feder-
alization of certain family law cases.  
A. Supreme Court Decisions 
There are several Supreme Court cases that illustrate the 
federal government’s reluctance to decide family law matters. One 
of the earliest cases involving jurisdiction of family law issues is 
Barber v. Barber.151 The issue in Barber was whether a divorced wife 
could have a different domicile from her ex-husband, which 
would allow her to sue in federal court based on diversity juris-
diction to recover for alimony due.152 The Court held that a wife 
could establish a separate domicile from her husband.153 Although 
 
 145. Cahn, supra note 1, at 1073. 
 146. Id. at 1073–74. 
 147. WARDLE ET AL., supra note 11. 
 148. Cahn, supra note 1, at 1073. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Linda D. Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, 36 ABA HUM. RTS. MAG. 3 
(2009), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human 
_rights_vol36_2009/summer2009/the_federalization_of_family_law.html. 
 151. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858). 
 152. Id. at 584. 
 153. Id. at 597–98. 
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the issue involved payment of alimony, the Court clarified that 
the issue was not about whether alimony would be allowed, but 
whether this was a family law issue.154 The Court determined that 
it was not.155 It stated, “this is not a suit asking the court for the 
allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. . . . We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the 
courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the 
allowance of alimony.”156 The federal government should not 
have jurisdiction over family law matters.157 Although the major-
ity and dissent disagreed over whether the issue at hand was a 
family law matter, they both agreed that family law disputes 
should be left to the jurisdiction of the state.158 
Similarly, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court up-
held federal jurisdiction because it determined that the dispute in 
question was a tort, not a family law matter.159 The Supreme Court 
held that federal jurisdiction was proper in a domestic relations 
torts case, where the lawsuit was not seeking a decree of divorce 
or alimony or child custody orders, but rather was alleging that 
the father committed torts against his daughters.160 The Court 
asserted that federal jurisdiction was correct in this case because 
domestic torts are not a traditional family law state matter.161 
 
 154. Id. at 584. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 602. 
 158. However, the dissenters in Barber (Chief Justice Taney, Justice Daniel, and Justice 
Campbell), argued that a wife could not have separate domicile from her husband and that 
the Court was encroaching on domestic relations matters best left to the states. Id. at 602 
(Taney, J., dissenting) (“It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Govern-
ment having its origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external, that it 
should assume to regulate the domestic relations of society; should, with a kind of 
inquisitorial authority, enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of 
private families . . . .”). The dissenters in Barber, citing Coke and Blackstone, asserted the 
common law principle that through marriage, a husband and wife become one person and 
the wife has no legal identify separate from her husband. Id. at 600. They argued that the 
federal government has jurisdiction in the same way English courts of chancery did. Cahn, 
supra note 1, at 1077. Chancery courts did not have jurisdiction over divorce and alimony; 
these family matters were left to ecclesiastical courts. Id. at 1089. 
 159. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706–07 (1992). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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A more recent case that discuses family law jurisdiction is Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.162 In Newdow, a father sued 
the school district, alleging that recital of the Pledge of Allegiance 
in his daughter’s school violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.163 The Court declined to rule on the consti-
tutional question and held that the father lacked prudential stand-
ing to sue because he did not have custody over his daughter, and 
it is not for the federal courts to determine issues of constitutional 
law when “hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect 
the outcome.”164  
B. Federalization of Family Law 
Although the Supreme Court largely leaves family law matters 
to the states, it is important to point out that there has been a trend 
toward federalization of family law.165 Despite not addressing the 
constitutional question in Newdow, federal courts have taken 
jurisdiction of family law matters with a constitutional element. 
For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that a 
Nebraska statute that only allowed foreign languages to be taught 
to children who had passed the eighth grade violated the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.166 More recent Supreme 
Court decisions have involved traditional state family law mat-
ters, including Roe v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges.167 
Even though family law has been federalized to a greater 
degree than in the past, issues of child custody and adoption—
barring a constitutional element—still fall squarely within the 
 
 162. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. at 17 (“In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by 
a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when 
prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of 
the plaintiff’s claimed standing. When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to 
affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than 
reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”). 
 165. See WARDLE, ET AL., supra note 11; see generally Elrod, supra note 150. 
 166. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). The educating of children is viewed 
as a family law issue and is left primarily to parents to decide. 
 167. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (deciding the constitutionality of 
state marriage restrictions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (deciding the constitutionality 
of state abortion restrictions). 
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boundaries of traditional family law disputes left to states. How-
ever, with the passage of ICWA, the federal government has given 
jurisdiction that would normally fall to the states instead to the 
Indian tribes in Indian child custody cases. 
IV. ICWA PURPOSES 
A. ICWA as a Remedy for Removal 
ICWA was enacted in 1978 to address the significant problem 
of Indian children being removed from their homes and placed in 
non-Indian boarding schools and homes.168 “Extensive congress-
sional hearings on the topic of Indian child welfare in the 1970s 
established that ‘[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children 
from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive 
aspect of American Indian life today.’”169 A high percentage of 
Indian child placements were in non-Indian homes and this 
removal was threatening the survival of the tribes because they 
were losing so many members.170 ICWA was a recognition by the 
federal government of the importance of cultural identity for 
Indian children.171 The purpose of ICWA was to protect Indian 
culture, limit state jurisdiction, and recognize tribal authority over 
adoption and custody issues involving Indian children.172 ICWA 
shows concern for the interests of Indian children individually as 
well as the tribe as a whole.173 Congressional findings state that 
“there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence 
 
 168. See PEVAR, supra note 5, at 292. 
 169. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 601 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th 
Cong. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531). 
 170. Id. at 601–02. “In many states, two-thirds or more of the Indian child placements 
were in non-Indian homes, and in some states the percentage was even higher. . . . Indian 
families suffered from the loss of their children, and tribes, in turn, lost their membership.” 
Id. at 602, 604. 
 171. Aliza G. Organick, Holding Back the Tide, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT AT THIRTY 221, 222 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel & Kathryn E. 
Fort eds., 2009). 
 172. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132. 
 173. BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES: ADOPTION AND CUSTODY 
CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 163 (2010) [hereinafter ATWOOD, CHILDREN]; 
Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 
145 (2004) (“ICWA, through its promotion of parental rights and tribal sovereignty, aims to 
protect the very civil existence of Native Americans and tribal governance.”). 
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and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”174 During this 
modern era, Congress has made it clear through the passing of 
this Act that “it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best 
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families. . . .”175 
B. Modern Era Removal 
The Boarding School Era was the predecessor to later removal 
efforts. Although removal of Indian children as an attempt to 
“civilize” them is no longer an official U.S. policy as it was during 
the Allotment Era, Indian children are still removed from their 
homes at higher rates than those of other groups.176 In the mid-
1970s, between 25% and 35% of all Indian children had been 
removed from their homes by states and placed in foster homes, 
adoptive homes, or residential institutions.177 In one study involv-
ing sixteen states, 85% of the Indian children removed from their 
families were placed in non-Indian homes.178  
Some factors contributing to the high rate of removal in-
volve socioeconomic problems that are prevalent in Indian com-
munities. Many Indian communities suffer from disproportion-
ately high rates of poverty, unemployment, substance abuse, and 
domestic violence.179 These factors increase the likelihood that 
children will be removed from their home by the state or tribes.180 
While these factors contributed, the majority of removals of Indian 
children when ICWA was passed did not occur as a result of 
physical abuse or neglect of the child, but rather because of 
cultural differences and bias.181 Additionally, the lack of state 
understanding of Indian culture has contributed to Indian chil-
dren being removed from their homes at higher rates.182 Even 
 
 174. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2012). 
 175. Id. § 1902. 
 176. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 12–13; Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, 
at 131. 
 177. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 291. 
 178. Id. 
 179. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 13. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back, 33 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 329, 361 (2008–09). 
 182. Id.  
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though ICWA standards are meant to “reflect the unique values of 
Indian culture,” states still often view Indian culture as a detri-
ment to children.183 Prior to the passage of ICWA, child state 
welfare officials were insensitive to the cultural family practices of 
Indians, including the involvement of extended family to care for 
children.184 These tribal norms were even viewed as neglect or 
abandonment.185 Removals often occurred because a social worker 
or judge assumed a child was being neglected if they were being 
cared for by an extended family member instead of a nuclear 
family member.186 Even now, many social workers are unfamiliar 
with ICWA and social work students are rarely required to take 
courses on ICWA.187 
C. ICWA Provisions 
To address these problems, ICWA establishes procedures state 
courts must follow when dealing with Indian child custody 
proceedings.188 ICWA applies only if the child is Indian. ICWA 
defines an Indian child as “any unmarried person who is under 
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is 
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”189 The general premise of 
ICWA is that it “establishes a preference for tribal court juris-
diction.”190 ICWA procedures include the following: 
First, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian 
children who reside or are domiciled within the reservation and 
 
Many judges and social workers simply did not comprehend or appreciate the 
value American Indians placed on the holistic tribe and extended kin. Indeed, 
tribal leaders pointed out that removals occurred because a social worker or 
judge presumed neglect when childcare was performed by a member of the 
child’s extended family outside the child’s nuclear family.  
Id. at 361–62. 
 183. Id. at 383. 
 184. Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106, at 603. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 362. 
 187. Cross, et al., supra note 12, at 3. 
 188. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132. 
 189. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). 
 190. In re M.M., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
05.MACLACHLAN_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:05 AM 
455 Tensions Underlying the ICWA 
 479 
concurrent tribal-state jurisdiction over Indian children who do 
not live on the reservation.191 
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children 
who are wards of a tribal court, whether they live on or off 
the reservation.192 
If a foster care placement or termination of parental rights pro-
ceeding for an Indian child originates in state court, in the absence 
of good cause, the court shall transfer the proceeding to tribal 
court if the tribe or either parent requests the transfer, absent an 
objection by either parent.193 
If a child custody proceeding originates in state court, notice of 
the proceeding must be given to the child’s tribe, and the tribe has 
a right to intervene in the proceeding.194 
The United States, the states, and every Indian tribe are to 
give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings of any Indian tribe regarding Indian child 
custody proceedings.195 
For those cases regarding Indian children that remain in state 
court, termination of parental rights requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and foster care placement requires a showing of 
clear and convincing evidence.196 
Finally, “[i]n an adoptive placement of an Indian child under 
state law, preference for placement must be given in the following 
order, unless the court can show good cause to the contrary: (1) a 
member of the child’s extended family, (2) other members of the 
child’s tribe, (3) other Indian families.”197 
 
 191. § 1911(a)–(b); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132. 
 192. § 1911(a); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132. 
 193. § 1911(b); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133. 
 194. § 1911(c); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 132–33. 
 195. § 1911(d). 
 196. § 1912(e); Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133. 
 197. § 1915(a). 
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V. STATE COURT CLASHES198 
The application of ICWA from the time of its passage has been 
inconsistent and unpredictable.199 Although some state courts 
attempt in good faith to apply ICWA, other state courts seek to 
find ways around ICWA through its ambiguous language such as 
“good cause.”200 State court clashes against ICWA are shown 
through judicially created exceptions to ICWA, which include 
the best interest of the child exception and the existing Indian 
family exception.201 
Since the beginning of the federal-tribal relationship, the 
United States has dealt with tribes as sovereign nations.202 
Although federal Indian policy has swung back and forth with 
regard to tribal rights and sovereignty, in our modern era, the 
federal government has landed on the policy of self-determination 
and support of tribal self-governance.203 State courts, however, 
have historically refused to accept tribal sovereignty and have 
pushed for authority over Indian tribes and their lands.204 For 
example, in Worcester v. Georgia, missionaries who were living on 
the reservation without state permission were arrested by the state 
of Georgia.205 The Court held that the state laws did not apply 
within the reservation and ordered Georgia to release the mission-
aries.206 Chief Justice John Marshall declared that Indian nations 
 
 198. Several ICWA scholars have used the term “clash” to characterize a number of 
tensions involved in ICWA and tribal sovereignty, including but not limited to the follow-
ing: state and tribal tensions; tensions between ICWA, parental, and child rights; and 
cultural tensions dealt with in ICWA cases. I follow their lead and use the term “clash” to 
characterize the state-tribal conflict because it illustrates the heightened tension and juris-
dictional struggle between state courts and tribes regarding the application and adminis-
tration of ICWA. See Atwood, Flashpoints, supra note 106; Philip (Jay) McCarthy, Jr., The 
Oncoming Storm: State Indian Child Welfare Act Laws and the Clash of Tribal, Parental, and Child 
Rights, 15 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43 (2013). 
 199. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 134. 
 200. Id. at 134; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b), 1915(a) (2012) (examples of the “good 
cause” language). 
 201. Cross, et al., supra note 12 at 5. 
 202. See supra Part II. 
 203. See supra Section II.F. 
 204. Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 138. 
 205. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 pet.) 515, 529 (1832). 
 206. Id. at 562. 
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are inherently sovereign, independent political communities.207 Geor-
gia refused to comply with the Supreme Court’s determination 
that the state did not have authority to regulate Cherokee land.208 
Recognition of tribal sovereignty by the states is not the root of 
the problem. As in the past, some states continue to refuse to 
accept tribal sovereignty. This trend is even more prominent in 
cases involving child custody because these cases are family law 
matters in addition to being civil disputes.209 Because child 
custody issues involving ICWA would normally fall squarely 
within traditional family law disputes left to states, many states 
have pushed back against tribal jurisdiction in these family 
matters.210 ICWA poses an obstacle to state courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction.211 The failure of state courts to properly apply ICWA 
undermines the goal of the Act, which is to give tribes exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the best interests of Indian children.212 If 
a tribe is not given notice about an Indian child custody pro-
ceeding, they do not have a voice in the proceeding and do not 
have the opportunity to express their determination of the child’s 
best interest.213 Even if the tribe is given notice, a state court could 
still choose to violate ICWA by refusing to transfer jurisdiction of 
the proceeding to tribal court.214 
States’ jurisdiction over family law, and not tribal sovereignty, 
seems to be the main reason states violate ICWA provisions. Even 
states that do recognize the sovereignty of Indian tribes in ICWA 
matters may not always do so, especially when faced with 
difficult child custody and adoption determinations.215 These 
difficulties stem in part from the increase of interracial marriages 
between Indians and non-Indians.216 “Children who . . . have 
blended or multiple cultural identities seem to trigger the most 
 
 207. Id. at 515, 559. 
 208. Id. at 515. 
 209. See generally Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133; Painter-Thorne, supra note 
181, at 380. 
 210. See Kunesh-Hartman, supra note 8, at 133. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 201, ch. 5. 
 216. Id. at 6–7. 
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contentious battles under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
and the most difficult jurisdictional contests in interparental 
disputes.”217 This is due to the fact that a non-Indian parent may 
feel that the tribe will “side” with the Indian parent regarding 
custody disputes, whereas an Indian parent may feel that his or 
her concerns are not heard in state court. Another situation in 
which a state court might refuse tribal jurisdiction is when a child 
is in a stable home environment, has bonded with his or her 
caretaker, and might suffer emotional and psychological harm if 
that home placement is disrupted.218 However, even under dif-
ficult circumstances such as these, Congress has laid out its intent 
in ICWA and state courts are obligated to apply ICWA. The 
following sections explain two common “exceptions” state courts 
have implemented in their desire to circumvent proper applica-
tion of ICWA. 
A. The Best Interest of the Child Exception 
One example of these state-tribal court clashes is the apparent 
“best interest of the child” standard219 used by many state courts 
to justify placing or keeping children in non-Indian adoption or 
foster-care families. Tribal courts generally believe that the best 
interest of Indian children is to stay within their culture, whereas 
state courts could easily promote a different perspective, based on 
a “white, middle-class standard.”220 States have used the best 
 
 217. Id. at 7. 
 218. Id. at 202. 
 219. The best interest of the child standard is a general standard that guides courts to 
some degree in family law cases including child custody, divorce, adoptions, visitation, 
emancipation proceedings, etc. See John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental 
Rights as Familial Rights in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. 
POL’Y 51, 67 (2014). “[T]he best interest standard attempts to impress upon the court the 
importance of viewing the facts, circumstances, and law of the case by the subjective needs 
of the child . . . .” Id. The standard is often vague and not easily defined. For example, 
before allowing termination of parental rights, some states require a finding that “termi-
nation is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 69. However, a vague definition is some-
what necessary. Halloran points out that “a universal proactive statutory definition of what 
is in a child’s best interest may run contrary to the purpose of the best interest standard in 
the first place because it seeks to impose specific guidelines on a condition that is as varied 
as human experience.” Id. at 71. 
 220. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989) (quoting 
H. R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 24 (1978)) (internal citations omitted). 
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interest of the child standard as “good cause” to retain jurisdiction 
over an ICWA matter rather than transferring the case to tribal 
court.221 ICWA provides:  
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or 
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled 
or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the 
court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such 
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe.222  
States also justify the use of this standard through language in 
ICWA.223 Section 1902 of ICWA states that the policy underlying 
the Act is “to protect the best interests of Indian children.”224 Prob-
lems with state court implementation of the best interest standard 
is that it is indeterminate.225 The vagueness and case-by-case 
analysis required coupled with state unfamiliarity and distrust of 
Indian culture present a threat to the purposes of the Act.226  
Research shows that state courts and judges use the Anglo-
American standard of psychological parent theory to determine 
the child’s best interests.227 This theory involves bonding of 
children to their caregiver and the principle that children require 
continuity in those relationships for proper intellectual, emotional, 
and social development.228 In states using this theory, unless 
jurisdiction is transferred immediately to tribal court, state court 
placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes creates greater 
possibility and more time with which the child may bond with his 
or her foster parent.229 However, the accuracy of the theory is not 
established and “[a]pplying its already doubtful conclusions to 
Native American families is questionable in light of testimony in 
 
 221. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 615 (1994). 
 222. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 223. Carriere, supra note 221, at 616–17. 
 224. § 1902. 
 225. Carriere, supra note 221, at 617. 
 226. Id. at 618. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 618–20 (noting that this theory was used to analyze the best interest in cases 
in which the court ultimately found good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, including In 
re C.W. 479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992), In re J.J. 454 N.W.2d 317, 331 (S.D. 1990), and In re 
T.R.M. 525 N.E.2d 298, 307–08 (Ind. 1988)). 
 229. Carriere, supra note 221, at 622–23. 
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the legislative history as to differences in Euro-American and 
Native American child-rearing practices and values.”230 
In Anglo-American culture and state and federal judicial deter-
minations, parental rights are fundamental, and parents are seen as 
having nearly absolute rights to rear their children as they see fit.231 
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held that a Washington 
statute that allowed any person to petition for child visitation with 
a showing of the child’s best interest was unconstitutional because 
it violated the mother’s fundamental liberty interest “in the care, 
custody, and control of [her] children.”232  
In Indian culture, however, extended family members play a 
much larger role in visitation and sometimes in custody awards.233 
In fact, some tribes have enacted grandparent visitation provi-
sions.234 One reason for this cultural difference is that the com-
munity plays an important role in Indian tribes.235 
[T]he voice of the collective—the Tribe—is a powerful force of 
cultural identity and survival that may trump the individual 
parent’s choice in child rearing. In the traditions of many Indian 
tribes, kinship systems—including uncles, aunts, grandparents, 
and other extended family members—play an essential role in 
the care and education of children.236  
ICWA accounts for Indian culture and its language reflects the 
value of tribal community over individual rights in making child 
custody determinations.237 ICWA’s purpose not only includes 
 
 230. Id. at 623. 
 231. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 134. 
 232. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, (2000).  
  The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contra-
vened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of 
his or her child. In that respect, the court’s presumption failed to provide any 
protection for Granville’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions 
concerning the rearing of her own daughters. 
Id. at 69–70 (internal citation omitted). 
 233. ATWOOD, CHILDREN, supra note 173, at 139, 132–42. 
 234. Id. at 137 (“The Rosebud Sioux Tribe, for example, has given its tribal court the 
power to grant reasonable rights of visitation to grandparents with or without a petition of 
the grandparents, so long as the court finds that visitation is in the best interests of 
the children.”). 
 235. Id. at 136. 
 236. Id. at 136–37. 
 237. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 363. 
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protecting the “best interests of Indian children” but also pro-
moting “stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”238 
B. The Existing Indian Family Exception 
The existing Indian family exception is a court-created 
doctrine that circumvents the purpose behind ICWA, despite the 
fact that the plain language of ICWA does not provide for this 
exception.239 Under the existing Indian family exception, if a court 
deems that a child is not part of a sufficiently Indian family,240 the 
court may refuse to apply ICWA in that case.241 ICWA defines 
“Indian child” as an unmarried person under eighteen years old 
and either a tribal member of a federally recognized tribe or 
eligible for membership in a tribe and the biological child of a 
tribal member.242 Tribes, not states, have the right to determine 
tribal eligibility and membership. The existing Indian family 
exception is applied in a minority of states, but in those states the 
application of this exception undermines ICWA and denies Indian 
children a right to their cultural identity.243 The Kansas Supreme 
Court created the existing Indian family exception in 1982.244 In In 
re Baby Boy L., a non-Indian mother sought to allow a non-Indian 
couple to adopt her child.245 The father was a member of the 
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, and the tribe intervened and sought to 
place the child with extended family or the tribe.246 The court held 
 
 238. Id. at 358 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012)). 
 239. Organick, supra note 171, at 222; Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 332. 
 240. Under the existing Indian family exception, state courts give themselves the 
power to determine whether an individual should be considered Indian or not, taking that 
decision away from the tribes. Cheyañna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to 
the Indian Child Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interest in Indian Children, 
66 LA. L. REV. 733, 748 (2006).  
Despite the fact that a tribe can recognize a person as a member, thereby making 
them American Indian within the definitions of the ICWA, under the exception, a 
state court ultimately determines if the member acts American Indian enough to 
appease their perception of what an American Indian should do or be. 
Id. 
 241. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 367. 
 242. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). 
 243. Organick, supra note 171, at 222. 
 244. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
 245. Id. at 173. 
 246. Id. 
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that ICWA’s purpose “was not to dictate that an illegitimate infant 
who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and 
probably never would be, should be removed from its primary 
cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the 
express objections of its non-Indian mother.”247 The court rea-
soned that Congress did not intend ICWA to apply to cases in 
which the child is not part of an Indian home or culture.248 Other 
state courts have held similarly, reasoning that if the child is not 
part of a recognizable Indian family, has not been exposed to 
Indian culture, or does not have significant ties to the tribe, then the 
purposes of the Act are not served and ICWA does not apply.249 
States that apply the existing Indian family exception ignore 
the plain language of ICWA.250 ICWA was intended to focus not 
solely on the individual family, but to take into account the tribe’s 
interest because of the impact of removal on the survival 
of tribes.251 
 
 247. Id. at 175. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“We hold that 
under the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary termination of parental rights 
respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child’s biolog-
ical parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a 
significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe.”); In re Adoption of 
Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 311 (1992) (“[W]hether or when a child meets the definition of ‘Indian 
child’ under ICWA is not controlling.”); In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1315–16 
(2002) (“We do not, however, see that interest being served by applying the ICWA to a 
multiethnic child who has had a minimal relationship with his assimilated parents, partic-
ularly when serving the tribal interests can serve no purpose which is sufficiently com-
pelling to overcome the child’s fundamental right to remain in the home where he . . . is 
loved and well cared for,” and attached to his foster parents.) (internal quotations omitted). 
But California later passed Family Code section 170, which codified ICWA into state law in 
order to abolish the existing Indian family exception. 
 250. Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 373–74; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indi-
ans v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) (“The numerous prerogatives accorded the tribes 
through the ICWA’s substantive provisions, [e.g., §§ 1911(a) (exclusive jurisdiction over 
reservation domiciliaries), 1911(b) (presumptive jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries), 1911(c) 
(right of intervention), 1912(a) (notice), 1914 (right to petition for invalidation of state-court 
action), 1915(c) (right to alter presumptive placement priorities applicable to state-court 
actions), 1915(e) (right to obtain records), 1919 (authority to conclude agreements with 
States),] must, accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of 
individual Indian children and families, but also of the tribes themselves.”). 
 251. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate the 
Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 
421–22 (1997) (noting that the existing Indian family exception “circumvent[s] the intent of 
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VI. NEW ICWA GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS 
To fully realize the purposes of ICWA, state court deference 
must be improved and violations must cease. To that end, the 
most important recent development in promoting the purposes of 
ICWA are the new guidelines and rules which went into effect on 
December 12, 2016.252 Additionally, state courts have previously 
taken steps to promote the purposes of the Act and are continuing 
to do so now. In recognizing the responsibility to correctly imple-
ment ICWA, one Montana state court noted that the court has a 
“duty to preserve the unique cultural heritage and integrity of the 
American Indians.”253 Some states have even passed their own 
versions of ICWA that in some cases exceed the Indian child 
protections of ICWA.254  
A. ICWA Guidelines 
In February 2015, former assistant secretary of Indian Affairs 
Kevin Washburn announced that the BIA had published revised 
ICWA guidelines to protect the rights of Indian families and 
children under the Act and to prevent the breakup of Indian 
families and destruction of tribes.255 Washburn stated that these 
updates have become necessary due to the continued noncompli-
ance of ICWA by state and federal courts.256 Two major situations 
have pushed the government to find better ways to enforce 
ICWA: the Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
and the consistent ICWA violations in South Dakota.257 
 
Congress to ameliorate the almost 100 year history of the displacement of Indian 
children . . . .”); Painter-Thorne, supra note 181, at 375. 
 252. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR IM-
PLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (2016), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs 
/groups/public/documents/text/idc2-056831.pdf [hereinafter BIA, GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEPT. 
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, RIN 1076-AF25, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
PROCEEDINGS, https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc1-034238.pdf 
[hereinafter BIA, PROCEEDINGS]; Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15; Brewer, New ICWA 
Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 253. In re Riffle, 922 P.2d 510, 514 (Mont. 1996). 
 254. PEVAR, supra note 5, at 305. 
 255. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
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In Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court held that ICWA did not 
apply when the Indian father had never had custody of the 
child.258 Some of the facts in Adoptive Couple illustrate how ICWA 
can be intentionally bypassed. In Adoptive Couple, the non-Indian 
mother, who was not married to the Indian father, placed the 
child for adoption without the consent of the father.259 When the 
mother asked him via text message if he would rather pay child 
support or terminate his parental rights, the father responded that 
he relinquished his parental rights.260 The attorney of the mother 
contacted the Cherokee Nation to determine if the father was 
enrolled in the tribe.261 However, the attorney misspelled the 
father’s name and incorrectly stated his birthday, and therefore, 
the Cherokee Nation responded that it could not verify the 
father’s membership.262 Four months after the baby was born, the 
adoptive couple served the father notice of the adoption pro-
ceedings for the first time.263 The father promptly contacted an 
attorney, and in the proceedings, he sought custody of the child 
and stated that he did not consent to the adoption (regardless of 
the fact that he told the mother earlier that he would relinquish 
his parental rights).264 After the South Carolina Supreme Court 
awarded custody of the child to the biological father, the 
adoptive couple appealed, and the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.265 
The Supreme Court held that several provisions in ICWA did 
not apply and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court, order-
ing the child to be returned to the adoptive parents. First, the 
Court held that the ICWA provision requiring that active efforts 
be made to prevent the breakup of Indian families before termi-
nation of parental rights can be ordered does not apply where the 
 
 258. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013); see also Kathryn E. 
Fort & Peter S. Vicaire, The Invisible Families: Child Welfare and American Indian Active-Duty 
Service Members and Veterans, FED. LAW., Apr. 2015, at 40, 41. 
 259. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558–59. 
 260. Id. at 2558. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 2558–59. 
 265. Id. at 2559. 
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child has never been in the custody of the Indian parent.266 
Second, the Court held that the provision requiring a heightened 
showing of harm to the child before parental rights can be invol-
untarily terminated does not apply where the child has never been 
in the custody of the Indian parent.267 Finally, the Court held that 
the placement preferences required by ICWA do not prevent a 
non-Indian adoptive couple from adopting an Indian child when 
no eligible Indian candidates have come forward.268 
The Court’s confusing interpretation of ICWA in Adoptive 
Couple parted with previous interpretations of the Act269 and 
seemed in fact to endorse the existing Indian family exception 
used by state courts.270 Assistant Secretary Washburn noted that 
after the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple, tribal leaders 
across the nation began to look for better ways to enforce ICWA 
and protect Indian tribes.271 Washburn stated that, although the 
Supreme Court decision in Adoptive Couple could not be reversed, 
something needed to be done to address ICWA misapplications.272 
In fact, the new guidelines confirm that state courts are prohibited 
from using the existing Indian family exception, including wheth-
er the Indian parent ever had custody of the child.273 
 
 266. Id. at 2557 (noting that § 1912(d) “conditions involuntary termination of parental 
rights with respect to an Indian child on a showing that remedial efforts have been made to 
prevent the ‘breakup of the Indian family’ . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012). 
 267. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557 (noting that § 1912(f) “bars involuntary 
termination of a parent’s rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to 
the Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s ‘continued custody’ of the child”); 
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012). 
 268. Id. (referring to 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012)). 
 269. Shreya A. Fadia, Note, Adopting “Biology Plus” in Federal Indian Law: Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl’s Refashioning of ICWA’s Framework, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09 
(2014). Fadia labels the Court’s decision “confusing,” given “[t]he Court effectively ruled 
that an individual is a parent under one of ICWA’s provisions, but that the same individual 
is not a parent under two other ICWA provisions.” Id. at 2009. 
 270. Shawn L. Murphy, Note, The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying “Existing 
Indian Family” Exception, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629, 630–31 (2014). 
 271. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See BIA, GUIDELINES, supra note 252, at 15. The “Existing Indian Family” excep-
tion is listed in the guidelines under “Factors that May Not Be Considered.” 
  If a child-custody proceeding concerns a child who meets the statuary 
definition of “Indian child,” then the court may not determine that ICWA does 
not apply based on factors such as the participation of the parents or the Indian 
child in Tribal, cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the relationship 
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Assistant Secretary Washburn identified ongoing ICWA vio-
lations by the state of South Dakota as a second concern that 
prompted government action to reinforce ICWA provisions.274 
Although many states continue to ignore or misapply ICWA pro-
visions and purposes, South Dakota is one of the worst offend-
ers.275 The Indian child population in South Dakota is only nine 
percent; however, Indian children make up about fifty-three 
percent of the total number of children in foster care in the state.276  
Upon moving to South Dakota, Patrice Kunesh investigated 
the state’s inadequate social welfare and criminal justice systems 
as they relate to Indians and tribal communities.277 She found that 
Indians are highly overrepresented in South Dakota’s welfare and 
criminal justice systems.278 South Dakota has utilized the best 
interest of the child exception to refuse transfer of Indian child 
custody proceedings to tribal court.279 The South Dakota Supreme 
Court has held that the needs and interests of the children 
must prevail and that ICWA is not meant as a shield to allow 
Indian children to be abused by their parents.280 However, this 
line of reasoning reveals that the state may believe the tribe will 
not consider these factors or do what is in the best interest of 
Indian children.281 
The BIA responded to Adoptive Couple and consistent ICWA 
violations by holding listening sessions and gathering comments. 
In 2014, the BIA held five listening sessions with tribes, judicial 
 
between the Indian child and his or her parents, whether the parent ever had 
custody of the child, or the Indian child’s blood quantum . . . . 
Id.; NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, SUMMARY OF THE 2016 ICWA GUIDELINES 2, 
https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2017ICWAGuidelinesSummary-1.pdf. 
 274. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South 
Dakota, 52 S.D. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007). 
 278. Id. at 249–50. 
 279. Amanda B. Westphal, An Argument in Favor of Abrogating the Use of the Best 
Interests of the Child Standard to Circumvent the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act in South Dakota, 49 S.D. L. REV. 107, 125 (2003). 
 280. In re S.G.V.E., 634 N.W.2d 88, 94 (S.D. 2001) (“We have always recognized that 
the needs of the children are paramount and that their best interests must prevail.”); In re 
S.D., 402 N.W.2d 346, 351 (S.D. 1987) (“Children should not be abused, neglected, or 
forlorned under the guise of cultural identity.”). 
 281. Westphal, supra note 279, at 127. 
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organizations, and child welfare professionals to understand 
custody situations and decide how best to address ICWA viola-
tions.282 The BIA also gathered hundreds of comments from tribes, 
child welfare professionals, and state court judges.283 The vast 
majority of comments submitted in response to the BIA’s request 
asked the agency to update the ICWA guidelines,284 which had 
not been updated since they were first published in 1979.285 
Washburn stated: 
 For too many years, some of Indian country’s youngest and 
most vulnerable members have been removed from their 
families, their cultures, and their identities . . . . Congress worked 
hard to address this problem by enacting the Indian Child 
Welfare Act. Yet, today too many people are unaware of this 
important law and, unfortunately, there are some that work 
actively to undermine it. Our updated guidelines for state courts 
will give families and tribal leaders comfort that the Obama 
Administration is working hard to provide better clarity so that 
the courts can carry out Congress’ intent to protect tribal 
families, preserve tribal communities, and promote tribal conti-
nuity now and into the future.286 
B. ICWA Rule 
The new ICWA regulations and guidelines went into effect on 
December 12, 2016.287 The regulations are binding law on state 
courts, whereas the guidelines are recommendations to assist state 
courts in implementing ICWA.288 ICWA had not been revised 
since its enactment in 1978 until the BIA published the new 
federal regulations in June 2016.289 Principle Deputy Assistant 
 
 282. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15 (noting that three listening sessions 
included tribes and two included judicial organizations). 
 283. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of the Assistant Sec’y–Indian 
Affairs, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y Roberts Announces Updated BIA Guidelines That 
Strengthen Implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act with Focus on Family 
Unification (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/id 
c2-058432.pdf. 
 286. Brewer, New ICWA Guidelines, supra note 15. 
 287. See BIA, GUIDELINES, supra note 252, at 4. 
 288. Id. 
 289. 25 C.F.R. § 23 (2016); Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15. 
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Secretary Lawrence S. Roberts290 announced that the new rule 
would deliver a more consistent interpretation and application of 
ICWA for child welfare workers, judges, state agencies, and 
state courts.291  
According to Roberts, “the new rule advances the highest 
ideals of the federal trust responsibility in protecting and pro-
moting cohesiveness for Indian children and their families.”292 The 
rule clarifies ICWA’s requirements, fosters consistency in Indian 
child custody proceedings, and promotes the purposes of the Act, 
which are to maintain Indian family and community.293 Under this 
new rule, when state courts encounter cases dealing with foster-
care, parental-rights-termination, and adoption proceedings, the 
courts will now be required to determine whether the child is an 
Indian child under ICWA definitions.294 State courts will be re-
quired to give prompt notice of involuntary proceedings and min-
imize unnecessary separations between Indian children and their 
families.295 The rule also updates and clarifies ICWA definitions.296 
Tribes and other commentators nearly universally noted the 
lack of ICWA compliance and consistency in state courts.297 
During public meetings held throughout the country, including in 
Rapid City, South Dakota, comments from the tribes and mem-
bers of the adoption industry conflicted over what constitutes the 
“best interests” of Indian children.298 However, Roberts noted that 
reunification with the child’s family is the gold standard of ICWA, 
and the new rule strives to correct the disparities among Indian 
children in state custody.299 Sally Jewell, chair of the President’s 
White House Council on Native American Affairs stated, “ICWA 
 
 290. Roberts served as acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs from January 1, 
2016, to July 28, 2016, following Kevin Washburn. 
 291. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See SUMMARY OF THE 2016 ICWA GUIDELINES, supra note 273. 
 297. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15; see also Allison E. Davis, Roadway to 
Reform: Assessing the 2015 Guidelines and New Federal Rule to the Indian Child Welfare Act’s 
Application to State Courts, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 91 (2016). 
 298. Brewer, Final ICWA Rule, supra note 15, at ¶ 13. 
 299. Id. 
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was designed to safeguard Native children from undue separation 
from their families and cultural identity. This rule will achieve 
consistent implementation of a law that remains critical to pro-
tecting the best interest of Native children and promoting suc-
cessful Native communities . . . .”300 
C. Potential Effects of These Guidelines and Rules 
Although it remains to be seen what effects the new 
regulations will have, the new rules and guidelines provide a 
reasonable expectation of improvement in state ICWA application 
because they clarify ICWA procedures. At the very least, state 
courts may have a more difficult time using ICWA’s ambiguities 
to support violations of the Act. However, the best interest of the 
child exception may continue to be used as a state court exception 
because the new rule fails to specify a definition for “best interests 
of the Indian child.”301 In response to commentator request for a 
“best interest” definition, the BIA stated that it is not necessary to 
define this term because it does not appear in the final ICWA 
rule.302 It is the BIA’s contention that a definition is not needed 
because “ICWA was specifically designed to protect the best 
interests of Indian children. . . . through specific provisions that 
are designed to protect children and their relationship with their 
parents, extended family, and Tribe.”303 Furthermore, these proce-
dures and objective rules avoid court decisions being made based 
on subjective values.304 
Although the new rule does not use the nomenclature of the 
existing Indian family exception,305 the rule is likely adequate to 
discontinue the use of the exception in the few states that continue 
its practice. The BIA refused to explicitly include a provision in 
the rule that states there is no existing Indian family exception 
because ICWA already defines an Indian child based on the 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. BIA, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 252, at 74. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 74–75. 
 304. Id. at 75. 
 305. See id. 
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child’s political affiliation with a tribe.306 ICWA does not include a 
provision that allows a court to determine whether a child is 
Indian based on the child’s or parent’s social, cultural, or geo-
graphic ties to the tribe.307 In fact, Congress expressly recognized 
that state courts were ill equipped to make determinations of the 
tribal relations of Indian people.308 The BIA noted that only a 
handful of courts continue to apply the existing Indian family 
exception and the great majority of states have affirmatively 
rejected it, including South Dakota.309 However, the BIA did 
decide to include in the rule a “mandatory prohibition on consid-
eration of certain listed factors, because they are not relevant to 
the inquiry of whether the statute applies.”310 Prohibited factors 
include “the participation of the parents or the Indian child in 
Tribal cultural, social, religious, or political activities, the rela-
tionship between the Indian child and his or her parents, whether 
the parent ever had custody of the child, or the Indian child’s 
blood quantum.”311 
Revised definitions address ambiguities in the Act. For exam-
ple, one concern is that states have identified a foster home as an 
“Indian home” under ICWA because an Indian child is placed 
there, regardless of whether the foster parents were Indian.312 The 
new rule clarifies that an “Indian foster home” is one where one 
or more of the foster parents is Indian.313 
Although not likely to completely eliminate future state 
violations of ICWA, the new rule and guidelines are a big step 
forward in addressing ICWA ambiguities and state court misap-
plication of the Act. 
 
 306. Id. at 91. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 91–92. 
 309. Id. at 92. 
 310. Id. at 93. 
 311. Id. at 93–94. 
 312. Id. at 78. 
 313. Id.; see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2016) (“Indian foster home means a foster home 
where one or more of the licensed or approved foster parents is an ‘Indian’ as defined in 
25 U.S.C. 1903(3).”). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Indian Child Welfare Act has shed light on issues of state 
and tribal sovereignty as well as the failure of state courts to 
recognize tribal jurisdiction in Indian child custody cases that fall 
under ICWA. Throughout the history of U.S. and Indian tribal 
relations, the federal government has recognized the inherent 
sovereignty of tribes yet diminished their power. Modern federal 
Indian policy, though, seeks to promote tribal self-governance. 
One response to modern federal Indian policy is the passing of 
ICWA to reverse the negative effects of widespread removal of 
Indian children from their homes. ICWA provides tribal courts 
with jurisdiction over custody and adoption proceedings involv-
ing Indian children. 
 However, states have pushed back against the federal 
government taking domestic relations matters out of their hands. 
Traditionally, the federal government has allowed state courts the 
authority to determine family law disputes. However, ICWA is a 
major wrench in state court jurisdiction over family law matters. 
Since the passage of ICWA, states have used a number of judicial-
ly created exceptions to get around proper application of ICWA. 
Although some states have reversed their incompliance with the 
Act, inconsistent application continues to be problematic. In 2015 
and 2016, the Bureau of Indian Affairs finally addressed these 
issues by passing revised ICWA guidelines and rules to clarify 
ICWA procedures and definitions. The hope is that the rules will 
better promote the purposes of ICWA in providing protection and 
cohesiveness for Indian children, families, and communities. 
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